Guided story
Still on the farm: India's agricultural workforce
About 41.6% of Indian workers remain in agriculture, down from 63.1% in 1991 but with a recent uptick, while the sector contributes only 16.3% of GDP.
How many Indians still work in agriculture?
In 2025, 41.6% of India’s employed people work mainly in farming, forestry, or fishing. That means more than two in every five workers are still on the farm. The long-term trend is a slow decline: back in 1991, the figure stood at 63.1%. Over 34 years, the share has fallen by about 21.5 percentage points. But notice the pace, it took over three decades just to drop by a fifth. At this rate, even by 2040, a very large chunk of Indians will still be working the soil. The data here comes from the World Bank’s ILO modelled estimates, which smooth out year-to-year bumps and make long comparisons possible. One thing to remember: a falling share does not mean the absolute number of farmers is shrinking. Because India’s total workforce keeps growing, the number of people in agriculture has actually risen even as the percentage dropped.
Share of Indians working in agriculture
World Bank · SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS
2025 · latest point
The share of workers in agriculture has fallen from 63.1% in 1991 to 41.6% in 2025, a slow decline of just 21.5 percentage points over three decades.
This line chart plots the percentage of India’s total employed population whose primary job is in agriculture, forestry, or fishing, using ILO modelled estimates from the World Bank. The line starts at 63.1% in 1991 and descends gradually, with small plateaus, to reach 41.6% in 2025. The downward trend reflects millions of workers slowly moving into industry and services, but the pace is sluggish. Even with this decline, agriculture remains the single largest employer. The chart also hints at periods of stagnation, for instance, the share barely moved in the early 2000s. It is important to remember that this is a percentage: as India’s workforce has grown from around 300 million to over 500 million, the absolute number of agricultural workers has actually increased, even as their share fell.
Why has the move out of farming been so slow?
The classic development path is for workers to move from farm to factory to office. In India, that shift has been slow and uneven. In 1991, agriculture held 63.1% of workers, industry just 14.6%, and services 22.3%. By 2025, agriculture is down to 41.6%, but industry barely grew to 25.8%, and services reached only 32.6%. The chart with three lines, agriculture falling gradually, industry rising modestly, services rising a bit more, shows that neither factories nor offices have absorbed the millions who should have left the land. The result: farming remains the largest employer, not because it’s attractive, but because other sectors have not grown enough to pull workers in. This is the textbook problem of jobless growth: the economy produces more, but without creating enough new non-farm jobs.
The slow shift from farm to factory to office
2025 · latest point
Industry and services have not grown fast enough: agriculture still employs 41.6% of workers, while industry and services together account for 58.4%.
This chart stacks three lines, one per broad sector: agriculture (falling), industry (rising slowly), and services (rising faster but still modestly). Starting in 1991, the three lines show the classic scissors shape, but the crossing point, when another sector overtakes agriculture, never arrives. Agriculture remains the thickest line at the end, at 41.6%. Industry grew from 14.6% to 25.8%, and services from 22.3% to 32.6%. The pace of shift determines whether the average worker’s productivity can rise. India’s lines move sluggishly, especially industry, which has never boomed as it did in East Asia. As a result, millions of workers are stuck in low-productivity farming. The chart is a visual summary of India’s incomplete structural transformation.
Did the pandemic reverse the shift away from farming?
The most recent official survey data from the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) suggests that after 2019, agriculture’s share of workers actually rose. In 2017–18, it was 42.4%; by 2023–24, it reached 43.5%. Meanwhile, services fell from 32.6% to 31.6%, and industry stayed flat at 24.9%. The pandemic triggered a reverse migration, millions of casual workers in cities lost their jobs and returned to their villages, taking up whatever work was available, often farming or farm labour. Even after the immediate shock faded, many did not go back. The PLFS data captures this distressing reversal. It does not mean India has permanently abandoned the path of structural transformation, but it shows just how fragile the off-farm job market remains.
The post-2019 reversal
2023-24 · latest point
PLFS data shows agriculture’s worker share rose from 42.4% in 2017–18 to 43.5% in 2023–24, reversing the long-term decline.
Based on the Periodic Labour Force Survey, this chart zooms into the most recent years. The agriculture line, which had been drifting downward, ticks up after 2019, ending at 43.5%. Services, which had been rising, drops from 32.6% to 31.6%. Industry remains flat at 24.9%. The pandemic-induced lockdowns crushed urban casual jobs, pushing millions of migrant workers back to their villages. Many took up farm work out of desperation, and the recovery has not fully re-absorbed them. This blip is a stark reminder that India’s structural transformation is fragile; a single large shock can undo years of gradual progress. It also raises a question: is this a temporary wobble, or does it signal a deeper weakness in India’s non-farm job creation?
Why do so many workers produce so little value?
Agriculture’s share of workers (41.6%) is nearly three times its share of the economy’s output. In 2024, farming contributed only 16.3% of gross value added, that is, the value of all goods and services produced, before taxes and subsidies. When you overlay the two series, the gap stares at you: a huge workforce producing a small slice of national income. This is the textbook definition of low labour productivity. Think of it this way: if every worker in agriculture produced the same as the average worker in the rest of the economy, either far fewer people would be needed in fields, or farming’s output share would be much larger. The reality is that too many Indians are sharing too little productive land, machinery, and know-how. Closing this gap is the central economic challenge.
Half the workers, a fraction of the output
2025 · latest point
Agriculture employs 41.6% of workers but contributes only 16.3% of GDP, a productivity gap that widens over time.
Two lines on one chart tell a stark story. The employment share (orange) falls slowly from over 60% to 41.6%, while the GDP share (blue) plunges from 41.7% in 1960 to just 16.3% in 2024. The space between the lines, the gap, is a measure of how little value each farmer produces relative to the average. In the 1960s, the two lines were close; today, they are far apart. This divergence happened because while some workers left farming, the sector’s output grew much slower than the rest of the economy, so its GDP share shrank. Meanwhile, the number of workers in agriculture remained high. The result: many people share a shrinking pie. This chart captures the heart of India’s employment problem.
Which sectors actually drive the economy?
If you look at where national output comes from, the picture is almost the opposite of employment. In 2024, services generated 49.9% of GDP, industry 24.6%, and agriculture just 16.3%. In 1960, agriculture was the giant at 41.7%, and services were smaller at 38.8%. Over six decades, services have grown to dominate, while agriculture’s importance has shrivelled, yet its grip on jobs remains. Industry’s share has barely moved, from 20.8% to 24.6%. This mismatch, services as the biggest value creator but the smallest employer relative to its share, and agriculture still the biggest employer, means that growth has not been inclusive. The challenge is to grow in ways that pull workers into higher-productivity sectors.
Where the economy's value comes from
2024 · latest point
Services generate half the GDP (49.9%), while agriculture’s contribution has halved to 16.3% since 1960.
This chart shows the composition of India’s gross value added, essentially, which sectors produce the national output. In 1960, agriculture was the largest at 41.7%, services 38.8%, industry 20.8%. Over six decades, the lines cross and recross. Agriculture slides down to 16.3%, while services rise to dominate at 49.9%. Industry’s share inches up to 24.6%. The crossover between agriculture and services happened around the 1980s, and since then services have pulled away. The chart makes clear that while farming has lost its economic weight, it has not shed workers at the same pace. This asymmetry, services led growth, but not employment, is a defining feature of India’s development path.
How does India compare with other countries?
In 1991, India and China had similar shares of workers in farming, India at 63.1%, China at 59.6%. Vietnam was even higher at 74%. Thirty-four years later, China’s share has plummeted to 21.7%, Vietnam’s to 25%, and even Bangladesh has fallen more sharply to 44.3%, though it started higher. Indonesia is at 27.3%. The world average is 25.8%. India, at 41.6%, stands out for how slowly the transition has happened. This is not because other countries started richer; Vietnam in 1991 was poorer than India but created manufacturing jobs that pulled millions out of fields. India’s manufacturing sector has not boomed in the same way, leaving workers stuck in low-productivity farm labour. The cross-country chart puts India’s sluggishness in stark relief.
How India compares on leaving the farm
2025 · latest point
India’s agricultural employment share is nearly twice the world average of 25.8% and far above China’s 21.7% or Vietnam’s 25%.
This multi-line chart places India alongside five comparators: Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the world average. All started with high agricultural shares in 1991, but their paths diverged sharply. China dived from 59.6% to 21.7%, Vietnam from 74% to 25%, both driven by manufacturing booms. India’s line drops more slowly and remains highest among the group except Bangladesh (44.3%). The world average line sits at 25.8%, showing how much India is an outlier among large economies. The chart is a powerful argument: India’s slow structural transformation is not inevitable, similar countries managed it much faster. It points to a missing ingredient: a robust, labour-intensive manufacturing sector.
What does labour productivity look like overall?
A broader measure of labour productivity, GDP per person employed, expressed in constant 2021 international dollars, gives a sense of the overall outcome. In 1991, each Indian worker produced about $6,601 (PPP). By 2024, that number had climbed to $24,430. That is a more than threefold rise, which is progress. But while the average is up, the average hides vast differences between sectors. The gap between a farm worker’s output and a services worker’s output is immense. This chart does not show the gap directly, but it reminds us that raising overall productivity means shifting workers out of sectors where they produce very little and into sectors where they produce more. The sluggish farm exit is why India’s aggregate productivity remains modest.
Output per worker
World Bank · SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD
2024 · latest point
India’s overall labour productivity has risen from $6,601 in 1991 to $24,430 in 2024 (constant PPP), but is still low relative to potential.
This chart plots real GDP per person employed, a standard measure of how much value each worker produces on average. The line rises steadily from 1991 to 2024, more than tripling. But the absolute level remains modest. In a sense, the line tracks the progress of the entire workforce, including those in high-productivity services and low-productivity agriculture. Because agriculture is a large chunk, it drags down the average. The implication is clear: if more workers moved to higher-productivity sectors, the line would rise faster. The chart does not show sectoral breakdown, but combined with the previous charts, it drives home the point that India's overall productivity gains are held back by the large farm workforce.
How long has agriculture dominated Indian work?
Historical reconstructions put the share of Indian workers in agriculture at 71.9% as recently as 1960. By 2010, it had inched down to 54.7%. The very long view, pieced together from academic datasets, shows a stubborn persistence. Even the green revolution and industrialisation after independence did not quickly empty the fields. The decline accelerated after 1991, but the sheer starting point of over 70% means that absolute numbers of farm workers kept growing for decades. India started with an extreme reliance on farming, and reversing that requires sustained, broad-based job creation outside agriculture.
The very long view
Our World in Data · Share of employment in agriculture (Herrendorf et al. and GGDC-10 data)
2010 · latest point
From 1960 to 2010, India’s agricultural employment share fell from 71.9% to 54.7%, a decline of just 17 percentage points over 50 years.
This chart draws on long-run historical reconstructions to show that as recently as 1960, nearly three-quarters of Indian workers were in agriculture. The line descends slowly through the decades, picking up speed only after the 1990s. By 2010, it had reached 54.7%. The dataset ends there, so the most recent decade is missing, but the long-run decline is clear. importantly, even in 2010, more than half of the workforce was still farming, a level many other countries had left behind generations earlier. This chart provides the deep context: India’s dependence on agriculture is not a recent phenomenon, but a centuries-old structure that is proving exceptionally hard to reshape.
Is the jobs guarantee scheme a sign of farm distress?
When farming or casual non-farm work dries up, rural households turn to MGNREGA, which guarantees up to 100 days of manual wage work per year. The person-days created under the scheme are a barometer of rural distress. The data, running monthly from 2013, shows peaks during drought years and economic shocks. In April 2013, 186.8 million person-days were created. By April 2026, that number was 109.9 million. The recent trend is down from the peak, but the demand remains high, especially in poor agricultural states. MGNREGA is not a measure of farm employment directly, but when agriculture’s worker share rises, as it did after 2019, MGNREGA demand often stays elevated, signalling that many rural workers are stitching together a livelihood from several sources, with the jobs guarantee as a last resort.
Rural work demand: the NREGA signal
IndiaDataHub · LAEMNREGPD11M
2026-04-30 · latest point
MGNREGA person-days created have fallen from a peak of 186.8 million in April 2013 to 109.9 million in April 2026, but remain high, signalling persistent rural distress.
This monthly line chart shows the total person-days of work provided under MGNREGA, a demand-driven employment guarantee. The series exhibits sharp spikes and troughs, often linked to monsoon failures or economic shocks. The peak in 2013 followed a drought; the dip in recent years may reflect some improvement, but the level remains substantial. When farm and non-farm employment options shrink, rural households sign up for this manual work. The chart therefore serves as a barometer of how many people are unable to find adequate other work. The recent trend, when read alongside the rising agricultural employment share, suggests that for many, farming and NREGA work are complementary survival strategies.
What do rural workers actually earn?
Daily wages in rural areas, where most agricultural workers live, reveal the floor under livelihoods. For men, the average rural daily wage in June 2025 was ₹454. Women earned ₹322, a gap of about ₹132 per day. Over the long run, men’s wages have risen from just ₹72 in 1998, and women’s from ₹163 in 2013. That sounds like a big increase, but these are nominal rupees, not adjusted for inflation. In real terms, the improvement has been much smaller. Also, the gender gap is stark: women consistently earn less for the same type of casual labour. These wages are what farm workers and other rural workers actually take home. When the farm cannot support a family, these daily rates determine whether they can survive without migrating.
Rural wages
2025-06-30 · latest point
Average daily rural wages in June 2025 were ₹454 for men and ₹322 for women, revealing a large gender gap and modest nominal levels.
Two lines track the average daily wage for casual rural labourers: men’s wages (starting 1998) and women’s (starting 2013). Men’s wages have risen from ₹72 to ₹454, while women’s have moved from ₹163 to ₹322. The gender gap persists, with women earning about 70% of what men do. These wages are important because they represent the cash income of millions of agricultural labourers. The rise over time looks impressive, but inflation erodes much of the gain. In real terms, the improvement is less striking. The chart also hints at seasonal patterns; wages often dip during the lean agricultural season. Together with the NREGA data, it sketches the material reality of rural work: insecure, poorly paid, and highly gendered.